decision because the decision in several places refers to aliens 'lawfully admitted' to the country rather than merely to aliens." But some officials convinced their peers that the decision applied to non-citizens regardless of legal status. By June 1972, the proposed regulation was published in the Federal Register, and the Nixon administration appeared well on its way to creating a federal right to welfare and Medicaid for all non-citizens, including unauthorized immigrants. 3 HEW, however, never implemented the proposed regulation. Instead, within a year it reversed course and adopted a new policy which, for the first time, prohibited states from providing welfare and Medicaid to unauthorized immigrants. Within four years, unauthorized immigrants were also barred from most other federally-funded programs.
***
The restrictive turn in federal policy during the Nixon years was a pivotal moment in American social policy, but one that welfare and immigration scholars have overlooked. The welfare scholarship for this period has focused on the legacies of the expansion of the welfare state through Johnson's War on Poverty, the failure of Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, and the politics of retrenchment that subsequently ensued. The dominant narrative paints this era as the moment when the public face of poverty and welfare shifted from white to black, and when whites' resentment toward blacks began to temper their support for welfare and liberalism more generally. Immigrants play no role in this narrative. 4 Immigration scholars, meanwhile, portray the 1970s as an era of rising popular nativism, but political stalemate on the regulation of unauthorized immigration. Scholars who study the emergence of policies that limit immigrants' access to social benefits focus instead on the 1990s.
According to these scholars, California led the way to restriction when in 1994 voters passed Proposition 187, which barred unauthorized immigrants from most non-emergency services.
While Proposition 187 was invalidated by the courts before it was implemented, a number of states subsequently passed similar legislation. In 1996, the federal government followed suit, passing the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, better known as "welfare reform." The legislation barred states from using federal funds to provide Medicaid and welfare to most recent legal immigrants. According to the dominant narrative, these federal restrictions were unprecedented, and represented a major departure from previous federal policy.
State-level restrictions on unauthorized immigrants were seen as redundant, since these immigrants were thought to have never been granted public assistance. Nevertheless, these restrictions were deemed significant because they denoted the emergence of a "new nativism," distinct from the "old" for its emphasis on immigrants' consumption of public benefits.
Proponents of these reforms, however, argue that restricting benefits to American citizens has been an important principle of American policy since colonial times. 5 Neither account is accurate.
When the modern welfare state was established in 1935, there were no federal laws barring non-citizens, even unauthorized immigrants, from social assistance. States were free to enact their own alienage-based restrictions on jointly funded programs, but in 1970 only Texas required Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid recipients to be U.S.
citizens. Arizona and eight other states barred non-citizens from some of their other welfare programs, but the vast majority of states did not ask applicants about their legal status. And welfare officials interpreted federal law to prohibit cooperation between welfare and immigration officials. All of this changed during the Nixon administration, when the federal government first barred unauthorized immigrants from nearly all federal welfare programs. Federal policies have grown more restrictive ever since.
Far from being unprecedented, therefore, the 1996 welfare reforms represented the culmination of a restrictive turn that started in the 1970s. The Nixon era, in fact, marks the moment when the boundaries of social citizenship-the line separating those with a right to social assistance from those without-were being redrawn. State poor laws had long restricted public assistance to individuals with a "settlement," typically residence in a community for a period of months or a few years. Under this logic, neighbors-whether citizens or aliens-were entitled to support in time of need; transients were not. But in the 1970s, welfare became limited instead by the terms under which an individual entered the nation. National citizenship eclipsed state and local citizenship as a key boundary of social citizenship. 6 To explain the origins and timing of the shift toward federal restriction, I draw on federal and state welfare records, court cases, legislative transcripts, constituent letters, and newspapers.
The roots of federal restriction, I argue, stretch back to the 1960s when changes in immigration and welfare policy led to an unexpected rise in unauthorized migration and an increase in the welfare rolls. These changes alarmed government officials, reflecting and reinforcing broader racial and economic anxieties. There was no evidence that unauthorized immigrants were responsible for the increase in welfare recipients. Nevertheless HEW's attempt to mandate coverage infuriated Texas welfare officials and members of Congress, who worried that the policy would increase costs and induce further migration. In response, HEW reversed course and adopted the new regulation barring unauthorized immigrants from welfare and Medicaid.
The 1970s, therefore, was not characterized by political stalemate on the regulation of unauthorized immigration; rather, it featured new efforts to regulate immigration by other means:
by using welfare policy to alter individual incentives to migrate. Few were happy with this outcome, however, including the state and local officials in the southwest who, perhaps inadvertently, helped bring about the change of policy. Barring unauthorized immigrants from welfare did little to control unauthorized immigration, which continued to rise. 7 Yet with mandatory restriction, states were no longer reimbursed by the federal government for the costs of social assistance given to unauthorized residents as they had been for almost 40 years. Instead of mandatory coverage or mandatory restriction, most state and local communities wanted the federal government to cover the entire cost or give them the option to restrict benefits when they so desired.
This policy shift had deep and lasting effects. Federal restriction exacerbated the consequences of illegality for unauthorized migrants who were no longer eligible for most federal programs. But the effects were distributed more broadly, too, reaching U.S. citizen children in mixed-status families as well as anyone suspected of entering the country illegally.
The federal restrictions adopted during the 1970s, therefore, represent another chapter in a long history of racial discrimination in welfare provision, albeit one that affected Latinos, especially Mexicans, in particular. 8 Federal restriction had important policy feedbacks, too, ushering in years of struggle between local, state and federal officials over who was responsible for the social-and especially the emergency medical-costs of unauthorized immigrants, sowing the seeds of discontent that helped propel the passage of Proposition 187 and similar state initiatives more than 20 years later. Paradoxically, decisions intended to liberalize access to non-citizens set in motion a chain of events that led to greater restriction.
Immigrants in the New Deal
The significance of the Nixon-era restrictions is evident when contrasted to the treatment The CES supported state discretion because it feared that requiring states to cover noncitizens in means-tested programs might spur a congressional backlash, which in turn might lead to federal restriction. This concern was not unfounded. Newspapers fanned the flames of nativist sentiment, and federal officials were deluged with letters from angry citizens protesting the granting of relief to aliens when so many Americans went without. According to several national polls, most American residents in the 1930s agreed that non-citizens should not receive relief, and those who did should be deported. Given this rampant nativism, the CES's Executive Staff Director, Edwin Witte, anticipated that an attempt would "be made to limit…federal aid to cases where pensions are granted to citizens. If an amendment to this effect is offered, I expect it will be adopted." Witte was not sanguine that states would grant "pensions to non-citizens."
"But," he clarified, "there is nothing in the federal bill which would prevent them from doing so." Instead of forcing states to cover non-citizens, federal officials tried to convince states to pass more lenient provisions and drop any alienage-based restrictions they had adopted. both authorized and unauthorized immigrants were eligible for these programs on the same basis as citizens. Furthermore, the Social Security Act's confidentiality provision prevented formal cooperation between welfare and immigration officials.
The Rise of Immigrant Status Restrictions
The restrictive Many applicants for public assistance were now also subject to status verification, in which applicant information was often forwarded to INS. newsmagazines ran "story after story" about the so-called "welfare mess," focusing on "mismanagement in state welfare bureaucracies" and "welfare cheaters." Media portrayals of the poor shifted dramatically, too. Once portrayed as a problem among rural whites, the new face of poverty and welfare was now overwhelmingly black. As whites came to associate welfare with African Americans, resentment toward those on assistance increased. 26 Some of that media attention, however, also targeted unauthorized immigrants. In the early 1970s, news outlets began to publish pieces about unauthorized immigrants' access to social assistance. In 1971, the New York Times ran a letter by a local INS investigator who complained that "These two million illegal aliens will also fail to pay $1 billion in Federal taxes.
They will attend our public schools and facilities, enjoy our welfare and social services and earn credit for Social Security retirement by this illegal employment to the tune of another $35 billion a year." If unauthorized immigrants were not on welfare themselves, they were blamed for driving up the public assistance rolls indirectly because job competition drove Americans to seek welfare. Mexicans were sometimes singled out in these attacks, especially in the Southwest. An article in the Oxnard Press Courier in 1970 averred that "California has long been known as a land of milk and honey. Its reputation is well known in Mexico, where to wetbacks…the word is out: 'Go to California, where welfare workers hand out free food, free money and free medicaldental care just for the asking. '" 27 Unauthorized immigrants' use of welfare, however, was not a salient public issue prior to restriction. I found few letters from the public on the subject in state and federal archives.
Moreover, no opinion polls asked Americans their views on immigrants' welfare use during this period, as they did during the Great Depression. Indeed, scholars agree there was little broadbased public concern about unauthorized migration in the early 1970s. This situation would soon change in response to increasing newspaper coverage and public statements by INS Commissioner Leonard Chapman, who claimed that America was being "flooded" with unauthorized immigrants. But this shift in public opinion transpired after HEW decided on federal restriction, not before.
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There was also no evidence that non-citizens were "abusing" welfare in 1972. In fact, some state and federal officials suggested that unauthorized immigrants were hesitant to use such services. Colorado's regional HEW director testified in 1971 that "the presence of illegal aliens who are recipients of welfare benefits is not a major problem. In fact, it is a relatively minor problem in this State." Texas authorities concurred, asserting that they believed the numbers to be quite low but had no data to prove it. Federal HEW officials questioned the value of even making an inquiry into the matter. In 1970, the foreign-born made up less than 5 percent of the population-the lowest percentage on record-and nearly a third of these were over the age of 65. HEW's own studies showed that only 11 percent of OAA recipients and 4 percent of AFDC heads were foreign born-a figure that included those who had naturalized, non-citizens in the country legally, as well as those in the country without authorization. The lack of data on the issue astounded congressmen at the 1971 immigration hearings. But since most welfare officials believed there were few unauthorized immigrants on welfare, trying to ferret out the few that were was a waste of time and resources. Unauthorized immigrants, they argued, came to the United States to work, not for welfare. persons on welfare in the county and this is growing between 8,000 to 10,000 a month because residency requirements were eliminated." He went on to state that 5,000 individuals from 43 countries had been approved for welfare over the last two years who would not have previously been eligible because they had recently moved to the state. "Even though some of the aliens have entered the United States illegally," Dorn noted, the "State Social Welfare Department gave them access to public assistance." The addition of 5,000 non-citizens over two years-only some of whom may have been in the country illegally-was relatively trivial, representing 2 to 3 percent of the growth at most. But lacking any legal mechanism to reinstate residence restrictions in the wake of the Shapiro ruling, officials looked for other ways to limit the growth of the welfare rolls. The Board of Supervisors adopted a motion "urging Governor Reagan and the Legislature to reinstate a citizenship requirement for welfare eligibility." The State Social
Welfare Board followed suit and urged the Governor to bar applicants who were either "temporary" or "illegal immigrants." At a conference on Immigracion y La Raza, in Los Angeles in 1971, attendees expressed "strong opposition" to the "Departments of Public Welfare…playing the role of immigration agents by denying services or benefits to those they deem to be here without papers." They asserted that "all people, whether with or without documents, have the right to jobs, unemployment and disability insurance, and to public welfare, if necessary, on the basis of qualifications and needs.
If all people are taxed alike, all people deserve equal service." La Opinion published an editorial cartoon of a needy individual looking up at a sign on the door of the welfare department, which read, "No hay ayuda para extranjeros," translating roughly to: "There is no help for aliens." The caption at the bottom of the page wondered "¿Se Aprobara Esta Propuesta?" Or in English: "Will this proposal be approved?" Collins (R-TX) put the matter bluntly: "Obviously, a comfortable welfare living will tend to encourage more and more aliens to come into this Country. We are trying to develop a system of getting the Wetbacks under control and HEW has an incentive program of encouraging them to enter our country." Congressman James Pickle (D-TX) therefore proposed an amendment, which would authorize HEW personnel to notify INS of any unauthorized immigrant who was receiving or had received public assistance. He then suggested that by passing this amendment, "it will be a direct message to HEW to get off its backside…and not allow this to continue to go on." Representative William Randall (D-MO) concurred, saying: "if this bill is passed with this amendment the executive branch, meaning HEW, are going to have to pay some attention to congressional intent." The amendment passed by a voice vote but the larger bill-which included employer sanctions-failed. 39 It is unclear whether Nixon was aware of any of these events. The President left a complicated legacy on race and welfare. Deeply opposed to "busing" and committed to a "southern strategy," which deepened racial polarization, the Nixon administration also helped to expand some minority rights, including affirmative action and bilingual education. Service. Many social welfare professionals in lower positions were replaced by "management experts" with no previous ties to the social welfare profession. Weinberger, Dwight and others had served in Governor Reagan's administration "where they vigorously implemented" the Governor's "cutbacks in welfare," which included the state ban on assistance to unauthorized immigrants. 40 In June 1973, the new team at HEW changed course and proposed a regulation mandating federal restriction of unauthorized immigrants in welfare and Medicaid. To justify the reversal, Weinberger cited the negative comments HEW received about its original mandate to cover, Congress's decision to bar unauthorized immigrants from SSI, and a desire for consistency across programs. The new policy required that beneficiaries be "either a citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the United
States under color of law"-now known as PRUCOL-"and must exclude any individual who is not lawfully in this country." The term PRUCOL was exceedingly vague because there was no such category in federal immigration law, and the phrase was not defined in the regulation. But it allowed federal officials to include some non-citizens who may not have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence but who nonetheless resided in the country under the full knowledge of immigration authorities, such as refugees or aliens granted a suspension of deportation. But the fact that there was no common definition of PRUCOL allowed for the development of different eligibility requirements across programs. In other words, a non-citizen might find herself "legal" enough to qualify for Medicaid or SSI, but not AFDC. The lack of firm guidelines resulted in great confusion and decades of litigation.
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Why HEW chose to enact a federal ban rather than leave the issue to the states is not clear. State officials, including those in Texas, did not demand federal exclusion. And optional coverage was the only policy alternative HEW considered when they decided to originally mandate coverage. Of course, thinking inside HEW shifted dramatically once Weinberger took over. In the years that followed, the new administrators explained that mandated exclusion was necessary, even desirable because it would save money and it served the larger aim of reducing incentives for unauthorized migration. Dwight also later claimed that Graham required restriction because the ruling mandated uniform state policies. Having abandoned the proposal to mandate coverage, they may have felt they had to require exclusion. But the necessity of uniform state policies is uncertain; federal officials have allowed optional state restriction since the 1996 welfare reforms.
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The Consequences of Immigrant Status Restriction
The consequences of federal restriction were significant for unauthorized immigrants, their family members, and those mistakenly presumed to lack papers-usually Latinos. Soon after the change in federal policy, reports emerged that the new verification procedures resulted in discriminatory treatment, as individuals applying for assistance or seeking health care were targeted for scrutiny based on surname, skin color, and foreign accent. Carlos Mata, head of San attempted to change her legal status; she did not know how and she was afraid of immigration officials who "could send me out of the country in spite of all the years I have been here." When she was no longer able to work, she was forced to move to a neighbor's "drafty tool shed." With the help of the $167 monthly county grant, Cardenas could finally afford an apartment. Once legal status requirements were in place for these programs, the path toward restriction was set, as various federal agencies followed suit, applying them to Food Stamps, Unemployment
Insurance, and other federal programs. The longer these restrictions remained in effect, the harder it was to change course because the logic of restriction was so symbolically powerful.
Reversing course was also difficult because the costs of federal exclusion were born by a handful of state and local governments. Mandated exclusion also heightened the perception of immigration as an "illegitimate burden" at the local level, reinforcing the logic of restriction.
State and local governments repeatedly called on the federal government to pay their share of the social costs of unauthorized immigration. In 1994, Arizona, California, Florida, Texas and New Jersey sued the federal government for reimbursement. Some recent state initiatives designed to bar immigrants from social services, though clearly fueled by racism, also reflected this frustration with federal policy. California's Proposition 187 was a case in point. Among other things, the initiative would have barred unauthorized immigrants from non-emergency services.
In addition to encouraging immigrants to "self-deport," Proposition 187 was designed to send a message to Washington: that the federal government should increase enforcement efforts and reimburse state and local governments for the social costs of unauthorized immigration. Getting federal aid-"that's what it's all about," explained Governor Pete Wilson. Ironically, the federal government responded by barring more categories of non-citizens in 1996-thereby increasing the state and local burden further. 51 The logic of restriction has in fact become so powerful that few scholars or immigrant advocates today appear aware that unauthorized immigrants were only first barred from federal welfare programs in the 1970s. What is more, the logic was quickly applied to other groups of noncitizens. As early as 1975, federal officials were discussing their desire to bar newly arrived legal immigrants from public assistance. 52 While one might have expected that the Graham case would have protected legal non-citizens' access to assistance, the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Diaz (1976) upheld the federal governments' ability to make distinctions between citizens and legal non-citizens.
The move towards federal restriction and greater cooperation between welfare and immigration officials in the 1970s was obviously significant for those excluded from assistance or threatened with deportation. This included not only unauthorized immigrants but American citizens as well, most of whom were of Mexican-origin. But it also represented an important shift in the way the federal government would attempt to regulate immigration: by using welfare policy to alter incentives to migrate. That there was no measurable impact on unauthorized immigration was immaterial-the symbolic value of restriction was good enough. The logic of using welfare policy to help regulate immigration would set the stage for ever greater restriction and tighter enforcement in welfare policy in the years to come. 
